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A “Race to the Bottom”
Globalisation and China’s labour standards
Anita Chan
1 The Chinese government rejoiced on the occasion of gaining World Trade Organisation
membership  in  November  2001.  There  was  an expectation in  Peking that  once  the
country became integrated into the world economy, it would be on the right track to
attain  economic  prosperity.  There  might  be  some  bumps  along  the  way:  some
industries and agriculture would suffer, affecting employment, but as a whole, it was
predicted, China would gain. Employment has been a major concern in China, and the
government’s  best  sell  was that  foreign investment would increase and the labour-
intensive  manufacturing  sector  would  gain:  according  to  one  estimate,  2.8  million
additional jobs in textiles and 2.6 million jobs in the garment trade, as the constraints
of quotas for garments and textiles end  1. 
2 As predicted, foreign investment has been flowing into China in the past year at the
expense of  its  South-East  Asian neighbours and the tiger economies of  Hong Kong,
Taiwan,  Korea and even Japan.  Hong Kong and Taiwan have been the nurturers  of
Chinese export industries for more than a decade, only to discover now that some of
their  own industries  are  being “hollowed out”  2.  As  one observer,  William Greider,
describes it,  China is  “sucking away” jobs.  “Globalisation”,  he writes,  “is  entering a
fateful new stage, in which the competitive perils intensify for the low-wage developing
countries. … In the ‘race to the bottom’, China is defining the bottom” 3.
3 In  other  words,  though  employment  in  the  low-wage  industries  in  China  may  be
expanding, the wages of the workers in these industries are not rising, and for many of
them have been falling. What within the Chinese system allows it to lead in this race to
the bottom in labour standards?4 First, let us examine the empirical evidence showing
that, when compared with other developing export-oriented countries, wages in China
are very low relative to the cost of living.
Chinese wages in comparative perspective
4 There  is  a  popular  image  that  the  global  divide  in  competition  in  world  trade  is
between the developed and underdeveloped countries. I would like to argue here that
increasingly the competition, particularly in the labour-intensive industries, is largely
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among countries in the developing world. The intense competition in wages among
these countries is well illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the minimum legal wage in
a number of countries around the world as of 1999.
5 This shows an enormous gap between the minimum wage in the United States and
those of developing countries in Asia and Central America—with the US minimum wage
at  least  twenty  times  higher.  Faced  by  cheap  labour  abroad  in  this  era  of  global
production, labour-intensive industries are basically finished in the US and in most
other high-wage nations. Such goods continue to be produced there only to a marginal
extent by using illegal immigrants5 and home workers 6, “sweated” at a wage well below
the legal minimum wage.
6 Competition in these labour-intensive industries lies instead today among the countries
of  the third world.  All  of  the  minimum legal  wages  in  the developing countries  in
Figure 1 hovered around US$30-50 a month. This is equivalent in China to 240-400 yuan
a month.  The legal  minimum wage in Shenzhen,  the Chinese city  with the highest
minimum  wage,  was  equivalent  to  only  US$42.  China  has  set  its  minimum  wage
standards  very  low,  to  the  point  that  it  is  even  competitive  with  Vietnam  and
Cambodia, two countries where the cost of living is lower than in China. In Mexico, El
Salvador and Nicaragua, the wage levels are slightly higher than Asian wages, but this
competitive disadvantage is largely cancelled out by the proximity of Central America
to the American market.
7 When China first instituted a minimum legal wage system in the early 1990s, it had the
good intention of protecting workers in the export sector. But soon the function of the
minimum  wage  changed  character.  It  simply  became  the  amount  that  employers
reported to the government they had paid their workers in the labour-intensive export
industries; they rarely pay assembly-line workers above the monthly legal minimum
wage. The great majority of the workers in this sector are migrant workers from the
countryside, and as can be seen from Figure 2, they are not sharing in the standard of
living of the urban population.
8 It can be noted from this table that the setting of a minimum wage level is extremely
decentralised  in  China.  In  most  Western  countries  there  is  only  one  nationwide
minimum wage, but in China there are hundreds. Each city or even a district in a city
can set its own minimum wage based on a formula provided by the central government.
This takes into account the cost of living in the locality, the prevailing wage, the rate of
inflation etc., and it is adjusted each year 7. The table shows that these minimum wages
have been rising every year, but when these increases are compared with the annual
consumer price indexes for each of these cities, it becomes evident that the rises in the
minimum legal wage only kept pace with inflation. In other words, even though the
Chinese  economy  is  rapidly  developing,  in  real  terms  the  minimum  wages  have
remained level throughout the 1990s.
9 As can be seen in Figure 2, the cities in Guangdong province and other big cities along
the coast have the highest cost of living and consequently the highest minimum wages.
Elsewhere in China, the minimum legal wages are lower, which poses a threat to the
coastal region. The results of this threat, as I shall explain, are shown in Figure 2.
10 Legally, the minimum wage in each locality is not simply supposed to keep up with
inflation.  According  to  the  international  standard  employed  by  the  Chinese
government, the minimum wage of a locality should be set within the range of 40% to
60% of the average wage in that locality 8. This Figure uses 40% as the cut-off point to
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see whether the minimum wages officially set by various localities have reached this
standard in past years. 1993 was the only year in which all of these minimum wages
fulfilled the Chinese government’s own criterion of reaching at least 40% of the average
wages. Since 1993, in most localities, the minimum legal wages did not attain even this
40% mark, in direct violation of the national directive requiring that it do so. Instead,
with  only  a  few exceptions  (see  the  squares  shaded  in  grey),  the  general  trend  in
minimum wages has been one of stagnation or steady decline when compared to the
incomes of urban residents. This results, for example, in the minimum legal wage in
Peking declining from 36.7% of Peking’s average wage in 1994 to only 27% in 1999; and
in Shenzhen city from 40% in 1993 to a bit under 24% in 1999. This means the income
gap between the regular urban population and the migrant workers kept on widening
in the 1990s 9.
 
Figure 1: Minimum wage standards of textile, garment and footwear workers in different countries,
1999 (in USD)
Source: Based on wage ﬁgures provided by U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International labor
Affairs, Wages, Beneﬁts, Poverty Line, amd Meeting Worker’s Needs in the Apparel and footwear
Industries in Selected Countries, Washington D.C., Departement of Labor, 2000, p.I-51.
11 Another important conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 2 is that globalisation
scarcely leads to improved wage conditions for the workers who make goods for export
compared to the populace at large. Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the two cities that have
the highest average income in the country, and the first cities in China that the central
government allowed to woo foreign investment,  have the lowest minimum wage to
average wage percentage. In these two cities it did not even reach 30%. The worst of all
the nine cities is Shenzhen, the most famous model in China of a special export zone.
The percentages in these two cities have been consistently the lowest of the nine cities
since 1997, dropping to a low of 23.8% in 1999. On the other hand, in the interior of
China the minimum legal wage in the city of Chongqing, which is the least linked with
the global economy, reached that mark of 40% in 1999. These figures reflect a very
worrying  trend.  As  a  region  becomes  more  prosperous,  it  violates  the  national
guidelines and seeks to maintain its  attractiveness to foreign capital  by keeping its
minimum wage level low, in order to compete with other localities in China in selling
the labour of migrant workers. The benefits of globalisation in accordance with this
competitive logic have not, and will not, trickle down to those who make the products.
12 What  is  even  worse—and  is  not  revealed  by  this  table—while  on  paper  the  local
governments comply with the central government’s decrees about raising minimum
wage levels annually to adjust to the average urban wage and inflation, in reality the
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wages of the migrant industrial workers are often considerably lower than the official
standards. For one thing, the minimum wage, set by the month, does not reveal the
illegally long hours worked by migrant workers to attain that minimum. According to a
survey I conducted in China’s footwear industry, the average workday there amounts to
about 11 hours each day, often with no days off—that is, about an 80-hour workweek.
Nor do the official statistics take into consideration the staggering amount of wages
owed but  not  paid  to  migrant  workers.  Of  the  51,000  cases  of  workers’  complaints
lodged by letters and by personal visits to the Shenzhen authorities during 2001, 43%
related to unpaid wages 10. One Chinese newspaper article described the non-payment
of wages as having become a “custom” in Guangdong 11. while another described it as
an “incurable disease” 12. When the illegally long work hours and these unpaid wages
are taken into account, a sizeable proportion of the workers are making considerably
less than the minimum legal wage.
13 In short, as China develops, the benefits have not trickled down to the assembly-line
workers from largely rural backgrounds who make the exported goods.  Indeed, their
situation has even worsened since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98; the downturn
intensified competition with South-East Asian labour, which had become much cheaper
in the wake of currency devaluations. Among the reasons why China is attractive to
foreign  investors,  who  have  been  rushing  into  China  at  the  expense  of  its  Asian
neighbours, is that local Chinese authorities have been able to hold down wages by
turning  a  blind  eye  to  violations  of  China’s  own  labour  regulations  and  laws.  The
central government normally does not intervene.
14 Competition within China between different regions exacerbates the problem of low
wages.  And the  central  government  has  intervened in  a  way that  encourages  even
lower pay. Though migrant workers’ wages in Guangdong province are very low, the
central  government  has  been  worried  that  Guangdong  is  pricing  itself  out  of  the
international  market.  The  government  therefore  has  started  to  encourage  foreign
capital  to  move  inland,  to  places  where  the  pay  is  even  lower.  The  owner  of  an
Australian  toy  company  who  sources  some  of  her  merchandise  from  China  noted
enthusiastically  to me this  past  year that she is  now contracting toy production at
factories further north and away from big cities. The products, she said, are just as
good and cheaper.
Mexico: China’s main competitor
15 The geographic  race  to  the  bottom that  operates  within  China  also  operates  in  an
international context. In the 1990s China’s main competitor for the American garment
market was Mexico, on the other side of the globe 13. Since the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico has gained a large number of new
clothing  factories.  Today  China  and  Mexico  are  competing  neck  and neck  for  the
American market, each supplying around 15% of all apparel imports to the US. Mexico
enjoys two substantial advantages over China: it is next door to the US (and hence can
meet a faster turnover rate for orders) and it enjoys an absence of quota restrictions
due to NAFTA. As a result,  Asian investors who serve as the subcontractors for the
name-brand Western  multinationals—and these  are  particularly  South  Koreans  and
Taiwanese—became  increasingly  active  there  in  the  1990s,  even  moving  apparel
production out of Asia to Mexico. Along the US-Mexican border assembly plants called
maquiladoras have mushroomed, employing about a million migrant workers in various
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labour-intensive industries. This number is still small compared to the 12 million in
Guangdong province alone, but it represents a 150% increase in Mexico since 1990 14. 
16 As in China, expansion in employment does not mean rising wages for Mexican migrant
workers. The minimum legal wages there are almost double that of Shenzhen, and this
produces pressures on Mexican wage trends. In the manufacturing sector, real wages
dropped by 20% during the 1990s. According to the International Labour Organisation’s
estimate, the migrant workers’ wages in Mexico’s apparel industry shed 28% of their
purchasing power in the period between 1994 and 1999.
17 Despite this drop in real wages, the maquiladoras recently have been losing ground. As
trade barriers continue to fall due to the WTO, the middleman firms from Taiwan and
South  Korea  have  begun  shifting  production  back  to  Asia,  particularly  China.  The
numbers  of  maquiladoras swelled  from 120  in  the  1970s  to  3,700  in  2000,  but  have
dropped by 500 factories since then 15. Pressures are therefore tightening on Mexican
enterprises to more vigorously compete with China’s long working hours and bargain-
basement wages. This also explains why Mexico was the last country to sign a trade
agreement with China, delaying China’s entry into the WTO. Mexico knew that when
the  trade  barriers  are  removed,  it  would have  much to  lose.  But  the  international
pressure was too great for Mexico to stand its ground.
China’s pass system—the drive to the bottom
18 There are numerous reasons why Chinese wages can be kept so competitive compared
to other countries. First, it has an almost inexhaustible supply of cheap labour from the
countryside.  Second,  the  decentralisation  and  deregulation  in  wage-setting  under
China’s economic reforms has enabled local governments to turn a blind eye to labour
exploitation. Third, there is no autonomous union movement in sight in the foreseeable
future  to  fight  to  preserve  wage  levels,  and  the  Chinese  government  is  intent  on
making sure that none is allowed to arise.
19 There  is  also  a  fourth  fundamental  reason—China’s  so-called  hukou  system,  or
household registration system, which prevents an uncontrolled rural-to-urban influx of
population. This works in similar ways to the pass system under South Africa’s former
system of apartheid. To be sure, the two systems differ markedly from each other in
origin and ideology. The South African pass system was intertwined with a history of
racism,  colonialism  and  the  development  of  South  African  capitalism,  all  of  which
favoured  the  control  of  movement  of  African  people  to  provide  greater  political
security and enhanced efficiency in the use of black labour. The ideology on which the
system was based was white  supremacy,  and apartheid was  the  cornerstone of  the
state-building project of the South African white ruling elite after World War II.
20 The hukou system in China has a very different history. It was established after the
Communist Party came to power in 1949. To ensure that the planned economy met the
basic needs of the urban population, a rationing system was instituted in the 1950s,
which in turn required the registration of people. As ration coupons could only be used
in the locality where they were issued, this automatically restricted the geographical
mobility of all people, not just peasants 16. To reside in a different locality, one needed a
special temporary certificate.
21 This system of passes has been retained to the present day. The constraints this system
places on the geographical mobility of migrant workers, and the means by which this
can drive down wages and other labour standards today, is what is similar to what
prevailed in South Africa. In China it is there by default. It was in place before it had its
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present function. It simply continued to be used, when it was found to work well under
a greatly changed economic system.
22 In this transitional period from socialism to capitalism, the temporary work permits
required under the hukou system act like sluice gates controlling the influx of labour
into  urban  centres.  The  hukou system  helps  to  regulate  the  flow,  letting  in  more
labourers when needed and driving them out when their number exceeds demand, or
when  the  number  stretches  local  facilities  to  the  limit.  When  workers  lose their
working ability due to industrial accidents, or when they have become too “old” by the
age of about thirty to keep up with the break-neck work intensity, the pass system
enables cities to ship them back to the countryside—because without a job a migrant
has no right to stay in an urban area. This kind of labour flexibility cannot be as easily
imposed on the local urban population.
23 As more and more state  factory workers  were laid  off  in  the nineties,  some urban
governments placed tighter restrictions on job opportunities for the immigrants. One
category of jobs after another, especially in the service industries, was reserved only
for  local  residents.  In  1993,  40,000  rural  migrants  in  Shanghai  were  detained  and
deported; but as the cities clamped down on opportunities, this rose in 1996 to 80,000,
and in 1997, 100,000 17. There are, however, regional differences in how strictly local
governments enforce the hukou system. In areas where the supply of labour does not
exceed demand by a large margin, the police and local government are considerably
more relaxed about the presence of migrants. This is the case in Chengdu in Sichuan
province and Fuzhou, Fujian 18.
 
Figure 2: Proportion of minimum wages to employees average wages in cities of China (1993-2000)
Sources: average wages are from various statistical yearbooks and minimum wages are from various
sources, including newspapers and labor bureaus.
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24 For  local  governments,  allowing  migrants  to  come in  from the  countryside  can  be
lucrative. Migrant workers generate local tax revenues by attracting companies that
want  cheap  labour, but  because  of  the  hukou system  the  local  government  has  no
obligation to pay anything for the welfare of these temporary sojourners. They are not
eligible for any of the medical, housing or unemployment benefits available to the local
urban populace.  Nor are the workers from the countryside allowed by China’s  pass
system  to  bring  their  families  with  them,  and  thus  the  urban  government  has  no
additional educational expenses to meet either.
25 Despite this system of permits, the enormous bureaucratic edifice that was erected to
control the influx of migrants has not been able to stem the flow, just as had occurred
in  South Africa.  It  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  exact  number  of  Chinese  peasants
surging out of poor regions in search of jobs, but a range of between 50 to 80 million is
often  cited.  In  the  week  immediately  after  the  Chinese  New  Year,  when  migrant
workers who have gone home for the festival return to the cities, bringing with them
relatives and friends, the effect on transport is dramatic. For instance, in a matter of
days Guangzhou, the largest city in South China, suddenly has to handle several million
migrant  workers  descending upon it  in  trains  and buses.  In  early  2002,  before  the
Chinese New Year, the Guangdong provincial government, in the hope of dampening
this  vast  simultaneous  inflow,  announced  that  factories  should  not  recruit  new
migrants at that time of year; but 5.2 million migrants nonetheless poured in after the
New Year, a quarter of a million more than the year before 19. 
26 This large volume of people looking for low-end jobs drives down wages and working
conditions and allows these migrants to be exploited by employers, who can pay them
the lowest possible wages. New arrivals, in particular, desperate to recoup the amount
they have invested in transport expenses and in applying for the array of necessary
documents and certificates before leaving home, will take any job available.
27 Here is the case of one migrant reported in a Chinese newspaper. The young migrant
was informed by a friend that if he went to Shenzhen he would find a job. But he was
advised that before he left he had to apply for a number of documents. These included a
“border region pass” (at 120 yuan, taking six months), a personal identity card (another
80 yuan, taking one month),  an unmarried status certificate (60 yuan, valid for one
year) and a certificate to prove that he was not born out of quota (45 yuan, valid for one
year), all of these totalling 305 yuan 20. To put this into perspective, the minimum wage
in Shenzhen in 2000 was 547 yuan for a full month’s work, and this young man would
be lucky if he could enter a factory that would pay him as much as that minimum wage.
28 On arrival in Shenzhen, armed with all these documents, he thought he could become a
“legal” migrant worker and could begin working without a problem. But the factory
demanded 300 yuan as a deposit before it would give him the job. He then had to spend
40 yuan for a work permit, and another 300 yuan for a temporary residence permit. It
short, on arrival at his destination he had to spend another 640 yuan. In all, without
including transport costs, he had to spend almost twice as much as the monthly wage.
Most new migrants therefore are usually in debt after they first arrive in a city.
29 According  to  official  statistics,  each  of  the  three  or  four  million  migrants  in the
Shenzhen Economic Zone on average spends 600 yuan a year on certificates 21. Migrant
workers have to carry these documents with them at all times or, if caught without
them, may be held in detention. To possess all of the necessary certificates, one needs
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to have proof of a job, and so there is a nervous race to secure one. The deposit that this
particular  migrant needed to pay to the employer is  symptomatic  of  the desperate
situation of most migrant workers. Paying a substantial deposit has become a common
practice at the foreign-funded factories. At first sight, the practice seems paradoxical.
 Instead of the employer paying a worker for the work he or she performs, the worker
first  has to provide a payment to the employers as  surety for  the job.  The deposit
obliges the worker to remain at the factory, or he or she forfeits it. To all intents and
purposes the worker is bonded labour 22.
30 Another practice used by many unscrupulous employers is not to pay a portion of the
wages every month, promising to pay the withheld portion at the end of the year. In
this situation, the longer a worker has worked, the more money he or she is owed by
the  employer,  and the  more  difficult  it  is  for  the  worker  to  leave.  This  leaves  the
worker  vulnerable,  scared  to  forfeit  all  of  these  unpaid  wages  when  facing  poor
treatment at the hands of managers.
31 Finally, and perhaps most effective of all, it is a widespread practice among employers
to take away the migrant workers’ documents. Without these, under China’s system of
permits, the workers could not look for another job even when the working conditions
in a factory are intolerable and they desperately want to quit.
32 Workers’  dormitories,  usually  located  within  the  factory  compound,  extend
management control over workers’ lives beyond work hours. Movement into and out of
the factory compound can be monitored and controlled. Disciplining workers is easier
because  there  is  near-total  control  over  them.  Especially  in  the  factories  in  China
managed  by  Taiwanese  and  Koreans,  where  the  discipline  is  so  strict  that  the
management style can be described as militaristic. In some of the bigger factories that I
have visited, workers are even marched to and from meals and to and from dormitories
in tight military-style squads 23.
33 With migrant workers so controlled and cowed, physical abuse has become pervasive in
some  of  the  factories  owned  and  managed  by  Taiwanese,  Koreans  and  Hong  Kong
Chinese, and acute occupational health and safety problems are also commonplace. A
startlingly high incidence of severed limbs and fingers has been recorded. In Shenzhen
city alone, there were over 10,000 certified cases in 1999 among a migrant population of
some three to four million 24.
34 The system of permits needs an enforcement agent—in this case the police. Under the
hukou system, much as in apartheid-era South Africa, detention by the police if caught
without  the  necessary  papers  is  an  inherent  part  of  the  system.  Their  behaviour
towards migrant workers has become associated with corruption and abuses of power.
Detention is associated not only with fines and deportation from the city, but also with
mistreatment, physical violence and forced bribery. With so many migrants pouring in,
the arrests are essentially random. In much of Guangdong, people who seem to be of
rural  origin  are  simply  pulled  off  the  streets  and  roughed  up,  sometimes  for  no
particular  reason.  Among  ten  young  migrants  whom  I  interviewed  recently  in
Shenzhen, five said they have been picked up by the police within the several months
they had been there, a few of them more than once; and nine out of the ten knew of a
friend or relative who had been detained.
35 Many migrants do not have all the right papers on them because they are not aware of
what they need. Others are too poor to buy them all. But oftentimes, through no fault
of their own, their documents are kept locked up by their employer; or they have left a
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factory without being able to get their documents back because the employer did not
want them to leave. As a result of the latter, borrowing documents from friends and
purchasing forged ones off the street have become very common 25, as it was in South
Africa.  According  to  one  survey  conducted  by  a  government  labour  bureau  in
Guangdong, 80% of foreign employers openly admitted that they did not care whether
the documents were fake or not, as this did not affect production 26, The infringement
of regulations being so widespread implies tacit approval has been granted by the local
authorities and police.
36 Yet this does not stop the police from detaining migrants arbitrarily. Police stations
consider this a profitable business, because bail, fines and forced bribes, also imposed
arbitrarily, can amount to several hundred yuan. Even neighbourhood committees that
have  no  power  of  detention  get  into  the  act.  Some  have  been  detaining  migrant
workers and charging bail 27. The practice has become so out of hand in the past couple
of years that the central government in January 2002 issued a decree reducing the fee
for a temporary resident permit to 5 yuan a year nationwide, to enable migrants to
afford one and thus avoid detention.  And in March 2002 the Guangdong provincial
government passed regulations emphasising that the detention of “vagabonds” should
be restricted to beggars and not applied to migrant workers who do not have the right
papers  on  them.28 But  rather  than  obediently  comply  with  the  regulations,  the
provincial police responded by declaring that they have done a good job in sheltering
beggars and vagabonds; and reaffirmed the necessity of rigorously implementing the
pass system, without mentioning that they were continuing to detain and abuse large
numbers of migrant workers 29. In a few months local-level governments and the police
came up  with  new fees  to  make  up  for  the  loss  in  revenues  and  private  incomes.
Proclamations of new policies do not mean elimination of the hukou system. Those who
gain from the system are not going to desist so easily.
37 As can be seen, the Chinese hukou system and the pass system under apartheid in South
Africa generated quite similar outcomes. They produced a large, vulnerable underclass
living  in  constant  insecurity,  accompanied  by  daily  discrimination,  repression,
hardship and denial of their human dignity.
38 In light of these circumstances, it becomes possible to perceive how the Chinese hukou
system can keep wages down more easily than in Mexico. As already noted, in Mexico
the  workers  who  produce  for  export  are,  as  in  China,  largely  migrants  from  the
countryside,  and the majority similarly are female.  But there is  a  major difference.
Almost all of the Chinese female migrant workers are single women in their late teens
or early twenties who, because of the household registration system, cannot bring their
families with them 30. Many factories make sure that only single women are recruited
by asking to see their officially issued identity certificates, which in keeping with the
Chinese  state’s  strict  family-planning  policy  require  that  the  marital  and  family
planning status of  each woman is  listed.  Since the workers  are poor single  women
living in dormitories, management only needs to pay them enough for their individual
survival 31.
39 In  Mexico  the  context is  different.  While  most  of  the  women  workers  in  the
maquiladoras are migrants from poorer regions, many of them have come with their
families, since there is no pass system, and quite a number are single mothers. Very
often  these  women workers  are  the  sole  bread-winners.  Since  they  live  with  their
families, a part of their waking hours has to be spent on “unproductive” chores (from
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management’s  vantage  point):  in  commuting,  in  household  tasks  such  as  cooking,
taking care of the old and the young. No matter how ruthless, there is a limit to the
amount of overtime work that management can squeeze out of these Mexican workers
—fewer hours than with the young single women in dormitories in China.
40 There are also legal pressures in Mexico to pay workers a bit more so that they can
provide for part of their families’ livelihood. The Mexican Labour Law states that “The
minimum wage must be sufficient to satisfy the normal necessities of the head of the
family  in  the  material,  social  and cultural  order,  and to  provide for  the obligatory
education of his children” 32. This article echoes Article 25 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of the United Nations. It is similar to the concept of a living wage.
Although in reality the minimum wage levels set in Mexico are far below the standard
stipulated in the law, the notion of a wage that can provide for a family exists.
41 No such concept of a “living wage” exists in the Chinese discourse on wages, nor is it
stipulated in the Chinese Labour Law. Even the migrant workers’ protests do not centre
on how low the  wages  are,  but  instead revolve  mainly  around the  issue  of  unpaid
wages. Only when workers have not been paid for several months, when the situation
becomes desperate, do the workers begin to protest. Local governments in Guangdong
province occasionally launch campaigns, especially just before Chinese New Year, to
collect  unpaid  wages  or  unpaid  payments  for  overtime  work  33.  But  these  brief
campaigns to collect money owed to workers are only the tip of the iceberg 34.  The
expectation of adequate labour standards is much lower in China than in Mexico.
42 In China, the official trade union is an arm of the Party-state. It has little autonomous
space to protect labour rights. In fact, because of the massive influx of foreign capital
and the rapid rate of industrialisation, the trade union’s efforts, even when undertaken
with good will, face a near-impossible task. A parallel situation used to exist in Mexico,
where the trade unions were affiliated with the government. But since the defeat in the
last election of the former ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, there is
now a fledgling independent trade union movement. This is challenging the old unions’
authoritarian and pro-management practices with the help of North American trade
unions and the anti-sweatshop movement. This anti-sweatshop movement is composed
of trade unions, NGOs, labour advocates, university students, human rights groups and
church groups. It grew rapidly in the 1990s and has become a force that can no longer
be ignored either by multinational corporations or governments.
43 Ripples of the anti-sweatshop movement have spread to Asia, and China. The concept
of corporate social responsibility is just beginning to circulate in China. The factories
there that are run by contactors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea are now
feeling pressure from the Western multinationals that they supply. The multinationals
have  nervously  begun  to  urge  them  to  upgrade  their  labour  conditions.  But  the
factories being monitored by the multinationals are just a small minority of the better
and bigger factories, among the thousands and thousands of factories that subcontract
production. The potential role of the state becomes important here. A willingness by
the Chinese government to enforce its own laws would be much more effective than
sporadic monitoring. But the Chinese government has not yet awakened to the growing
pressures  emanating  from  the  West  for  improved  labour  standards  in  the  export
industries.
44 A few weak rays of hope have emerged in the past two years elsewhere in Asia. Three
countries, Cambodia, Vietnam and more recently Thailand, have expressed interest in
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improving labour standards within their borders to attract foreign capital. Cambodia
has  signed  a  bilateral  agreement  with  Washington  that  accepts  linking  labour
standards to trade and has agreed to let the ILO monitor progress. The Vietnamese
government has publicly encouraged its factories to try to raise standards in order to
acquire the certifications issued by an American-based organisation that verifies labour
standards for Western corporations. The Thai government is currently engaged in talks
with  this  organisation  about  operating  training  programmes  to  upgrade  labour
standards  in  Thailand.  That  is  to  say,  three  Asian countries  are  now taking a  new
direction in their industrial development strategies. They are trying to attract foreign
investment and trade by raising labour standards instead of depressing them.
45 It  is  not  clear  whether  Peking  is  aware  of  this  new  strategy  adopted  by  its  Asian
neighbours. But so far, China has not shown any signs of changing its policy of low
labour standards. The government has not publicly addressed the issue of corporate
social  responsibility,  unlike the Vietnamese government.  The Guangdong provincial
government has tried to alleviate some of the most blatant abuses, but no fundamental
change in policy has been adopted. Let me quote here the director of the human rights
programme in Asia for Reebok:
Who enforces Chinese labour law? Nobody. If it were enforced China would be a
much better place for millions of people to work in. But it is ignored more than in
any other country I work in 35. 
46 There  have  been  a  few  reforms  of  the  Chinese  hukou system,  but  only  to  allow
successful people with considerable money or education to apply for an urban hukou.
The controls over the unskilled migrant workers who work on the production lines and
construction sites, imposed by the pass system, remain the same. And the police seem
adamantly against any changes. The hukou pass system seems likely to remain in place
for  the foreseeable  future,  and China will  continue to  dominate the world’s  export
market, to the point that the new initiatives taken by Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand
may possibly collapse under the weight of Chinese competition.
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